4 these armies and their leaders into a relationship of dependence on those who bred and supplied these animals -in many cases nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists with whom the imperial state already had a troubled relationship. This ensured that any campaign required months, if not years of logistical planning, and deep pockets to pay for both supplies and carriage. It also imposed structural constraints on the distances such armies could travel in barren country, and on the numbers of troops that could be supported. In this paper I propose to examine the consequences of this dependence on animal transport through two linked case studies of colonial warfare in Central Asia: the army of the Indus's march into Afghanistan in 1839, and the Russian winter expedition to Khiva in the same year.
12 I argue first of all that these cases reveal that colonial military power had to accommodate the economic and social realities of the pastoral societies it was attempting to conquer or face disaster. Secondly, the careful long-term planning and substantial budgets that long-distance expeditions of this kind required rule out the popular 'man-on-the-spot' explanation for
European imperial expansion into Central Asia. It was simply impossible to launch spontaneous, unplanned campaigns in this region. Finally, logistical constraints rendered that recurring spectre in British imperial thinking, a Russian invasion of British India, a physical impossibility.
I -Camel Transport
Both the Khiva expedition and the army of the Indus relied on camels for transport -double-humped Bactrian camels beyond the Oxus, single-humped dromedaries in India and Afghanistan. Both these modern armies, though equipped with the latest in available military technology, were thus dependent on local knowledge and resources when it came to actually moving around. Each was, in a way, a colossal caravan, an apparently startlingly archaic means of projecting European power into Asia. In fact, as William McNeill has shown, even in the 19 th century it would be a mistake to think of camel transport as an anachronistic, ineffective survival from an earlier era, although it is true that by the 1830s its days were numbered. 13 In the early 19 th century camels were still the principal form of long- 12 For an account of the intertwined political background to these invasions see Alexander Morrison 'Twin Imperial Disasters. 14 Camels have an unusually low energy cost from locomotion compared to other mammals, and this is not proportionally increased by the addition of a load. 15 The camel caravan was fantastically efficient, required almost no infrastructure, and was capable of carrying goods very long distances very cheaply at a steady 4km an hour in flat country. 16 This was in part because camels could graze as they travelled and carried a substantial supply of fat, making the transport of large quantities of fodder unnecessary. Most caravans consisted of no more than a few strings of six camels, meaning that they were unlikely to totally denude any route they passed across, and even the largest caravans in the Middle East had no more than 1,000. 17 However, the quantities of camels which moved with the Khiva expedition and the Army of the Indus were like no caravan Central Asia had ever seen, the former having 10,000, the latter over 30,000 beasts carrying food, ammunition, fodder and baggage. Under these circumstances, many of the economies associated with caravan travel simply broke down, because even the richest landscape could not sustain that number of animals passing through it. Whilst they could travel for up to a week without eating, in order to remain in good condition each camel 16 Indeed so regular is the camel's pace that James Rennell, the first surveyor of Bengal, thought that it could be used to calculate distances in regions where obtaining fixed points by celestial observations was difficult: James Rennell 'On the rate of Travelling, as performed by Camels: And its Application, as a Scale, to the purposes of Geography' Press, 1975) would need 10-20kg of plant matter a day, 18 meaning a total daily requirement of 300 -600 tonnes for the Army of the Indus's camels. To transport even the lower amount would itself require another 1,000 camels, adding another 10,000kg of fodder to the army's requirements -accordingly, even assuming the minimum consumption of fodder and a 300kg load per camel (close to the upper limit possible), if every one of the 30,000 camels on the march had carried nothing but fodder, it would only have sufficed for 30 days. This makes it clear enough why it was essential that the camels lived off the land during the march and were well-fed before it, but the landscape of Sindh and the Bolan Pass did not yield this amount of grazing, even assuming the camels would be given time to feed properly. To this were added problems with climate, loading and management, which together added up to very high mortality rates. As Malcolm Yapp has rightly noted, 'Camels were probably the principal sufferers from the forward policy in Central Asia during these years.' 19 While the army of the Indus killed an enormous number of camels (close to two thirds of those that set out), it did ultimately reach its destination, and the failure of the British invasion came almost three years later and largely for political reasons, though these were linked to financial problems caused in part by poor logistical planning. It was the Khiva expedition which failed altogether because almost 90% of its camels died on the march, and it is to this that I will therefore turn initially.
II -The Khiva expedition
By comparison with the 21,000 men who marched from Hindustan into Afghanistan with the army of the Indus, General V. A. Perovskii's expedition to Khiva was relatively small, with only 5,000 men, but it had to cross some of the most hostile territory on the planet, carrying all of its supplies, as there was no possibility of living off the land. The main challenges to the expedition were thus always logistical rather than military, as Perovskii had predicted from the very beginning: 'the success of the military enterprise against Khiva will be founded almost exclusively on the correct assessment and consideration of the means and Despite the vast number of camels and the other preparations for the expedition, there was one commodity which could not be carried in anything like sufficient quantities, and that was water. It was largely for this reason that Perovskii made the fateful decision to launch the expedition in winter, when there would be snow to supply this deficiency. In this he was taking a calculated risk. The Russians were well aware of the probable effects of intense cold and wet, not only on the soldiers, but on their transport. As Ivanin later wrote, one of the difficulties the Russians encountered was that:
'As camels cannot endure cold, dampness and wet, they are mostly kept in the southern part of the Steppe. This would naturally retard and render more difficult the collection of camels and their transmission to Orenburg, the more so, as the southern Kirgiz tribes were less under Russian subjection than those in the north, being more amenable to the influence of Khiva.' 40
The illustrations accompanying Ivanin's account show that the expedition's camels would indeed be provided with heavy leather jackets, giving them the appearance of oddlyshaped pantomime horses. Nevertheless, the whole expedition was a gamble on the weather.
As somebody (possibly Dal') put it in a hastily-written note on the expedition's departure:
'With our arrival on the Ust-Yurt, pray that there will be snow, but not too much; that the ground will not be frozen; that the storms will not last too long; do not worry about frost in calm weather, but in general, for all that they are animals and not Christians, pray for the camels as you would for us sinners; without them there is no salvation for us.' 43
III -The Road to Aq Bulaq
Dal's letters are probably the most vivid testimony we have of the hardships of the march as it progressed. In them we can trace the deteriorating condition of the camels, and with it the expedition's chances of success. Dal' was well aware both of the dependence of the expedition on its camels, and its subsequent dependence on Kazakh drivers to manage them, not least because they had to clear away the snow before they could eat. He expressed some misgivings about this, but concluded that there had been surprisingly few desertions.
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He described how even in the early stages, fuel was so scarce that they were burning 'the fresh dung from underneath the camels. 12 then unloaded the camels and horses and turned them loose for 1½ to 2 hours to allow them to forage, having cleared away as much snow as they could from the ground. 47 On the 8 th December the column ran into a terrible storm which halted the march altogether ' The heavens are dull, the sun swims in a sort of semi-transparent dusk, pale and colourless. The horses stand in their frozen leather blankets as if in armour, hanging their heads and waiting for oats, their manes hanging down in icicles, drifts of snow cover their backs, the camels lie like dead things on their bedding, one alongside the other, like bales, like giant bundles or trunks, they chew what they ate yesterday, and today God willing!' 48
Two weeks later Dal' wrote that almost a fifth of the camels were already sick and unfit to work, and a couple of days after that he estimated that even including the sick, the expedition only had 8,000 of the 10,400 camels it started with. The force halted for almost a month at the fortification on the Emba, where an attempt was made to recover the strength of men and beasts whilst waiting for a break in the weather, but none came. The column was dependant on Kazakhs not only for transport, but also for its communications with
Orenburg, which were carried by Kazakh messengers. By late December these too were coming under severe strain:
'In carrying out the request of the authorities I sent out at different times several Kirgiz [Kazakhs] in the wake of the force which has set out into the Steppe with the Orenburg Military Governor and his companions, in order to take to them items and despatches sent from Orenburg; but up until now not one of these envoys has returned.
[…] because of the great distance and because of the powerful storms and still more because of the emptiness in this expanse between my camp and the Aty-Yakshi auls [nomadic settlements] near the fortress, constructed on the branch of the river Emba, these Kirgiz who were sent ahead may have lost their lives and thus also have lost state property.
[…] All those whom I had prepared to carry designated packages have already been sent after the force which set out into the Steppe. Now the Kirgiz ask me to represent to the view of the authorities that they give us an exemption from undertaking such hardships, owing to the distance and aul-lessness of these places.' 49
Throughout his later memoir of the expedition Ivanin referred often to the possibility that the Kazakhs on whom the force relied for the management of its camels might mutiny or go over to the Khivans, largely because he assumed they favoured their Muslim co-religionists. 50 Matters did come to a crisis when the columns prepared to move off from the fortification at Aty-Yakshi on the river Emba, which they had only reached with the greatest difficulty, through still deeper snow to the advanced post at Aq Bulaq.
'Rumours had spread amongst the Kaisaki [Kazakhs] about the closeness of the Khivan forces in overwhelming numbers, about the uniting of the Kokand troops with them & c. The enemy's spies made use of this, it would seem, and sought to shake their nerve with terrible threats from the Khivan Khan and with the undoubted preponderant numbers of his forces. In consequence of this the camel drivers of the whole column, more than 300 people, at the very moment of departure positively and unanimously stated that they would go no further, but would return with the camels to their auls. Every exhortation was in vain; I exhausted every spoken persuasion, but succeeded in nothing. The suggestions of Sultan-ruler Aichuvakov also had no effect. The crowd grew larger, noisy groups summoned their comrades; the disorder grew from minute to minute.
[…] As Kirgiz [Kazakhs] from other columns began to join the crowd I had it surrounded, and told them that they would all be shot if they persisted in this disobedience. To this some of the most vehement, coming forward, stated that they were all prepared to die, but that to go on was against their faith, and that caravans never travelled when there was such a frost.' 51
Two of the ringleaders were shot, and the crowd dispersed. Despite these growing difficulties, at the beginning of January, as the force advanced to Aq Bulaq, Dal' was still full of bombast, writing that 'the camels cannot perish suddenly;
we may lose a third on the way, or a half -and we will carry on until the last', 56 but just three days later he was forced to admit that the camels were now so tired, and progress so slow that 'if we are going to move like this, then we will never reach it. Only yesterday, with a grieving heart, was I forced to accept this sad truth.' 57 It was not until three weeks later, however, that Perovskii finally admitted that they could advance no further, and announced to the force that they would retreat to the Emba. his force was in, and the degree of coercion which had been required to secure the necessary camels in the first place:
'When the means and strength of this region where still fresh, and not used up, it was only with great difficulty that over eight months in place of the 12,000 camels we had demanded, we gathered 10,400. These camels, hired for fairly negligible rates, or, to be more accurate, demanded, have perished; out of them only about a tenth have survived; the loss has been so significant, that it extends to a million and a half [roubles] , and the nomads [ordyntsy], of course, are unwilling to submit to a similar transaction and now it will be essential to send light military forces into the steppe for the purpose.' 63
In the same letter, however, he stubbornly continued to insist that late autumn and winter were still the only time when campaigning in the steppe was possible.
The remnants of the Khiva expedition would eventually limp home at the beginning of July 1840: 1,054 soldiers (and an unknown number of Kazakh drivers) had been 'buried on the steppe', and of those who were left over 600 were suffering from scurvy and the after-effects of frostbite: Kosyrev describes horrendous scenes in the military hospital at
Orenburg, where the smell of rotting flesh rose from the bandaged stumps of their limbs.
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He also attests to the devastating human impact the heavy mortality had in the small, highly refusal to listen to his Kazakh drivers when they urged him to turn back at the Emba hugely increased both the human and animal cost of this failure. By the time he himself decided to retreat a month later, half his camels were dead and the rest dying, while a third of his men were also either dead or incapacitated by frostbite and scurvy.
IV -Collecting Camels for the Army of the Indus
By comparison with the sad fate of the Khiva expedition, the invasion of Afghanistan 70 would appear to have been a logistical triumph. Although the main column of the Army of the Indus also had to pass through some hostile and relatively barren territory on its route through Sindh, the Bolan Pass, Qandahar, Ghazni and Kabul, 21,000 troops made the march with only negligible casualties: there were attacks by Baluchi raiders on the column, and a few officers and men, both British and Sepoys, died of heat-stroke -one group after 'they lost their way, halted under a tree and imprudently drank brandy to refresh Subsequently the army was to be supplied with 15,000 eggs and 4,000 chickens per day, whilst Lord Auckland also ordered that a further 50,000 maunds of grain, with camels and oxen to carry it, should be collected for the army's onward march. Another 50,000 maunds would be sent downriver from the Punjab by boat to meet the army at Shikarpur, despite the objections of the Amirs of Sind, within whose territory this lay. 79 Auckland's own correspondence with the Secret Committee of the East India Company notes the success of these arrangements, and he added further that the Government granaries of the Sikh kingdom at Multan were opened to his forces. However, in reviewing the commissariat arrangements Auckland also referred to:
'The difficulty in procuring a large number of camels has been very much greater than had ever been apprehended. I transmit transcript of a letter of the 3d February from the Deputy Commissar General with the Bengal column […] It will be observed, that he looked to having (together with a perfect abundance of provisions) above 27,000 camels at command, which would be sufficient for the carriage of about 2½ months' supply of grain for a force of the strength of the Bengal division. With this number, which may be all expected to have assembled at Shikarpore by the middle of March, an adequate force for the enterprise will, I have every confidence, be efficiently provided; yet many of the camels are reported have been in a sickly and weak condition, and this branch of the commissariat must continue to be a subject of constant anxiety and watchfulness. I have […] urged the purchase and despatch of camels from all quarters towards Shikarpore. I indulge a strong hope that a considerable supply will, at no distant date, be procurable from the Afghan provinces themselves.' 80
As in Central Asia, so in India, the use of camels in warfare had a long history, although here they were single-humped dromedaries rather than the double-humped Bactrian variety. 81 Together with bullocks they were what gave the armies and courts of Northern India their mobility, employed both as baggage carriers and as draught animals to haul artillery. They were capable of carrying loads of 150-300kgs over long distances, required little or no fodder in all but the harshest environments, and could travel up to 30km in a day, although in Northern India in the 18 th century the more usual march of an army in battle array was no more than four kos (about 15km It is notable that very often the British were buying these camels outright, rather than hiring them for the duration of the campaign. This was a decision that had been taken quite early on. Burnes wrote from Shikarpur in November 1838 that 'After a month's delay in endeavouring to hire Camels Lieutt. Scott has resolved on purchasing them & though the outlay at first will be considerable, the plan may in the end prove most economical. The Sindians are not used, as in India, to hire out their beasts of burthen by the month but by the trip, which does not suit the purposes of the army. I am not however altogether without hopes that some Camels may not be hired. Burnes's decision to purchase rather than hiring the camels would be supported by Auckland, and was to have profound consequences for the management of these unfortunate animals. Sir John Keane laid out the logic of this arrangement in a letter to Auckland early in 1839:
'In the opinion your Lordship has expressed, that it is preferable to purchase than to hire camels, not only myself, but also the Resident in Sinde and the Bombay Government fully concur -the system of hiring camels is both expensive and unsatisfactory. Their owners might, under a threat of leaving us at a time they supposed their services could ill be spared, demand more hire or play any other trick. We are now making purchases of Camels by degrees, and will go on to a large amount if we can get them. The drivers are brought from the territory under our own rule in India, to take care of them. Keane's assumption of the disloyalty and untrustworthiness of drivers unless they came from British territory echoes the language used by Perovskii and Ivanin, and this decision would have similarly disastrous consequences. The close relationship between camels and their drivers, who were usually also those who bred and reared them, is attested in much Islamic poetry and hagiography. 103 As we have seen, Perovskii had realised that camels needed to be managed by those who bred them (even if he ultimately chose to ignore their warnings) and by the late 19 th century this was the practice recommended by the standard authorities on the use of camels in warfare: 'Asiatics and the inhabitants of northern Africa get far more out of a camel than we do; in fact there is no comparison, because not only do they depend on him for a living, but for their lives; consequently they take care of him, and do not override, overdrive, or over-pace him.' 104 In 1839 this logic was trumped by the British fear of betrayal. The drivers were instead brought from British Punjab and
Gujarat, but contrary to expectations this did not secure their loyalty, as desertions were reported almost from the outset. 105 The fact that drivers were unfamiliar with the particular breeds of camels they were called upon to manage (let alone with individual beasts) would have still more serious consequences.
V -Camel Catastrophe on the Bolan Pass
Despite the thousands of camels brought to Shikarpur in 1838-9, the British still complained constantly of a lack of transport: this was because so many of them died on the journey. As Auckland put it:
'The only drawback to the entire success of the arrangements for the march to the Indus arose from a considerable mortality which unfortunately showed itself among the camels after passing Bahawulpore. A new forage, joined to the fatigues of a protracted journey, proved destructive to many of those most useful animals.' 106
As the Army of the Indus made its way through Punjab, Sind, and up the Bolan Pass to Qandahar, it left a trail of dead and dying camels in its wake that dwarfed even the terrible mortality of the Khiva expedition. James Atkinson 
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'Camels are bad travellers in rain, sliding and slipping with their long legs at every step; great numbers fell on the road, and some could not be got up for a long time, even after their loads were taken off; many of the grain camels stopped half-way, unable to go on; loads of hay, grain and camp equipage lay scattered on the road as I passed, the mud fetlock-deep, and worse in many places.' 109
When he reached Sukkur, where the army had crossed the Indus, Atkinson wrote that his tent had to be pitched on the beach, 'as higher up the ground was covered with dead camels, which produced an intolerable stench.' The following morning 'I started at four a.m., and for the first four miles, where the advance columns of the army had halted for a short time, the effluvia from the dead camels in a state of decomposition was dreadful, pungent and foetid beyond description; it exceeded any thing that can be conceived.' 110
Severe storms also added to the mortality of camels in the Bolan Pass, and throughout his journey Atkinson 'passed dead camels continually.' 111 According to Augustus Abbott, an officer who took part in the march, one Brigade was supposed to have lost 2,000 camels in one stage of the march through the Bolan Pass, and by the time the column reached Qandahar Abbott estimated that it had lost no fewer than 20,000 camels, or over two-thirds of the total the British had secured. 112 He suggested that many of them were severely overloaded, carrying up to fourteen maunds at a time rather than the regulation five. distances. 113 If some of the Army of the Indus's unfortunate beasts were really carrying up to 500kg loads then it is scarcely surprising they collapsed, as the consensus of scholarly opinion appears to be that this is only possible over very short distances. 114 The explanation for the number of deaths may also have lain in the British military insistence on marching in single daily stages of sixteen miles. Richmond Shakespeare, after seeing how his Turkmen companions managed their camels and horses on his journey from Herat to Khiva, wrote that 'the native plan of dividing the distance to be crossed in the twenty-four hours into two stages, is a good one; and should another army of the Indus leave India, I think they would find this plan answer. Your camels and your cattle have the cool of the morning and evening for work, and the middle of the day to feed, and they have a good night's rest, instead of being loaded or harnessed in the middle of the night.'
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The death of so many camels on the march prompted an inquiry from the chief veterinary officer. He noted that disease first appeared among the camels just after Bahawalpur, and attributed this to the withdrawal of grain rations from the commissariat transport animals, who were forced to browse on very saline tamarisk and drink brackish water from the Roree. It is possible that this was a factor, as camels can poison themselves in unfamiliar pastures, 116 but poor management was almost certainly more important:
'The order of march, laid down by the military authorities from the starting-point of the expedition, was particularly harassing to the carriage cattle of an army moving in a tropical climate.
[…] The camels were frequently obliged to halt and stand under their loads, exposed to the sun […] The baggage seldom reached the new ground before one or two P.M., and the camels, jaded from a tedious and harassing march, were then driven to a considerable distance from the camp in search of forage; at the approach of nightfall, they were brought to camp, after perhaps two hours' grazing, 117 and the food thus obtained was not only deleterious in quality but of insufficient quantity. On the 26 th of December, I addressed the military authorities on the subject, and urged the necessity of a depot marching over night, under a sufficient guard. I was, however, overruled.
[…] The mortality did not, as was expected, disappear after the Army crossed the Indus. The forage on the right bank of the river was of no better quality than the produce of the opposite shore. During the halt of the troops at Shikarpore, the casualties increased to an alarming extent. The camp was surrounded with dead camels, and the effluvia from their carcases, producing a tainted state of the atmosphere, communicated a fresh disease to the surviving cattle. […] 113 Leonard considered that the maximum load for a camel on a long march should be 300 -350 lbs (150kg). Through the difficult pass of Bolan, a distance of fifty-seven miles, the cattle found no forage, save the rank and noxious flags growing in the borders of the marshy swamps in the valley debouching from the Pass; the troops crossed the "Dasht-i-be-Dawlut," an immense plain without water, and entered the valley of Shawl, where the food of the camels was confined to "rooknee," or southern-wood, a plant which, though producing different effects, proved no less destructive than the tamarisk to animals unused to it.
After entering the Bolan Pass, the registered variations of temperature on the march, and during the halt of the troops at Quetta, exhibited an average of forty-five degrees between Sun-rise and Sun-rise, or during twenty-four hours, and the cattle were not provided with shelter, or proper clothing to protect them against the injurious effects of the sudden transitions from heat to cold; many of the camels which reached Quetta in good condition, perished from the change of climate.
Some prospect of relief was offered in the month of May, by the springing of the Jawasa plant, the favourite food of camels, but the cattle were then so much reduced, that the improved quality of the forage produced no visible effects on them; and camels recently purchased, and picketted with apparently healthy cattle, caught the contagion, and frequently died from the disease.'
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He cited other difficulties, notably the dependence of the army's civilian camp followers on Commissariat supplies, which in turn prevented the carriage of sufficient fodder, but did not explicitly mention the use of hired drivers as a problem (though he did note the much greater care that Afghan camel-owners took to protect their beasts from cold weather). It seems likely, however, that most of the problems he cited, and the corresponding high mortality rate among the beasts under his charge, ultimately stemmed from this fact. This was not simply because, as British military experts would later claim, 'Hired drivers as a general rule are utterly worthless scamps, whose sole knowledge of a camel is to have seen him stalk through the streets of a town of which they are the refuse', 119 but because even within India camels are not all alike, being bred for specific purposes.
According to the Siraj al-Tawarikh, on passing through Bahawalpur Shah Shuja was presented with a peshkush of thirty different types of camels by the Nawab.
120 Even assuming the good will and expertise of the drivers the British had brought in from Gujarat, the chances were that they would be unfamiliar with the particular breed of camel placed under their charge, many of which would be varieties totally unsuited to hilly terrain and a cold climate. Leese noted that plains-bred camels have a longer stride, but weak hindquarters, and that they , 1912 -1914) The British and the Russians alike chafed at the restrictions on their freedom of movement imposed by dependence on camel transport, and through this on 'native' camelbreeders and drivers. As the railway network slowly spread across India, reaching Peshawar by 1879 and Quetta in 1885, British dependence on camel transport began to diminish. In Central Asia, this transformation took place at more or less the same time: in 1876 General Lomakin, the commandant in Transcaspia (modern-day Turkmenistan) estimated that over 20,000 camels had died on Russian military expeditions against Khiva over the previous four years 'one can imagine what a heavy burden this sad circumstance is on the economic situation of our Central Asian possessions', while the requirements of forage and rest which they imposed also slowed troop movements. To complicate matters further, in Transcaspia it was the Turkmen themselves who were simultaneously the main breeders of camels and the main objects of Russian aggression, and they were understandably reluctant to supply them. 128 'At the moment when there is a steppe expedition, we hire camels and camel drivers, a great deal of time is lost in this; the secret of the expedition gets out; the enemy has time to take measures to impede or slow down the collection of camels, and to establish the proposed plan of the expedition. With this system of collecting camels, there is no way of knowing their strength, carrying capacity or familiarity with packs, with that certainty which is essential for military enterprises, and thus calculate with accuracy what quantity of supplies it is possible to carry on camels gathered by this means; what length of stages it is possible to make with them, and what distance they can travel without feeding. Beyond this we also have to hope that during the vicissitudes of war the Kirgiz [sic] drivers will not leave with the camels, or go over to the enemy, and abandon the force in the steppe in a hopeless situation. ' 136 His solution to this problem was to find a means of transporting infantry using camels, thus both speeding up the progress of steppe expeditions (meaning fewer provisions and thus fewer baggage camels were needed) and obviating the need for unreliable Kazakh drivers. This was a revival of an idea first put forward in 1858 by General Katenin, the Governor of Orenburg, who proposed hanging a cumbersome wooden armchair on each side of the camel, allowing it to carry two infantrymen at a time: it had been approved as an experiment by the Tsar; however while the published report suggested that this system should be used for all expeditions where speed was essential, it never seems to have been put into practice. 137 Ivanin also thought greater use could be made of steppe horses, and proposed establishing stud farms for them along the Ural and Terek rivers to improve the breed and make them more fit for military use. 138 Above all, however, he advocated rearing and maintaining a permanent reserve of 40,000 camels directly for military purposes, along the lines (so he believed) of what he still referred to as the East India Company and the Chinese Empire. Ivanin's proposals were rejected by the cavalry remount division, and by the Regional Staff in Orenburg, who wrote that improving the breed of the steppe horses was a slow process, and above all that as soldiers and Cossacks alike were unable to manage, let alone rear camels, it was necessary to remain with the current system of hiring them from these represented a much more concrete assertion of sovereignty in the region, and helped to create a new and inexorable logic of conquest.
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Even with this new infrastructure the numbers of troops involved in Central Asian expeditions remained small -in the Russian case never more than 5,000 men. This was sufficient to overcome the limited opposition the Russians met from Central Asian states and nomadic groups. Nor did it prevent the British from launching punitive campaigns along the North-West Frontier, or into Afghanistan itself in 1879-1880, although it made permanent occupation much more problematic. However, logistics did ensure that these two armies would never confront each other directly in Central Asia. The Russian conquest of India, so beloved of "Great Game" theorists then and now, was a chimera precisely because of these constraints -something Russian Generals with Central Asian experience often stated in public (to the incredulity of British journalists), 144 and which in fact reflected their conclusions in internal documents whenever the topic of making a 'demonstration' against the British in India was discussed at the highest political level. A serious invasion force would have needed at least 150,000 men -and at least 300,000 camels to transport supplies. 145 This was a physical impossibility, something that by the 1890s British Military
Intelligence in London seems to have understood, but which continued to be stubbornly ignored by the General Staff in India. 146 This also suggests that one of the most popular theories regarding Russian expansion in Central Asia -that it was undertaken by 'men on the spot' without sanction from the centre -was rarely if ever true. 147 The transport arrangements for steppe and desert expeditions required months of preparation, together with a substantial budget that had to be approved in St Petersburg. Finally, the neglected history of camel transport in the conquest of Central Asia sheds at least a little light on the human, animal and local dimensions of a process that is usually understood only in grand, geopolitical terms. As Peter Perdue has noted of the Qing conquest of Inner Asia one hundred years previously, local environmental, animal and human factors -grain, fodder, camels and the pastoralists who bred and drove them -were more decisive than the desires of statesmen or the tactics of generals in determining the success or failure of military conquest in these arid regions. 148 Far from the chanceries of Whitehall, St Petersburg, Orenburg and Calcutta, the course of European expansion in Central Asia was marked by the lines of decaying carcasses of camels that had died of exhaustion.
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